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We test for hypercrowding out as a signal of market concerns over fiscal 
dominance in five Latin American countries.  Hypercrowding out occurs 
when fiscally dominated governments’ domestic credit demands are 
perceived as so intrusive to a nation’s financial system that a move 
towards fiscal surplus lowers interest rates and increases growth.  We 
sample five Latin American countries to test for these relationships.  
Judged by the results of vector error correction models, three nations test 
clearly positive, suggesting market concern despite their recent efforts 
towards fiscal balance.  (JEL E430, E620, O230, O540) 
 
  That the current real value of any government’s net liabilities always equals the 
present discounted value of future primary surpluses is a mathematical condition (See 
appendix) for solvency.  Sometimes markets enforce these equivalences by methods not 
to a government’s liking.  Governments that anticipate such enforcement will run 
monetarily dominant regimes, in which primary fiscal balances are adjusted to limit debt 
accumulation beyond a certain point.  That is, the government conditions its fiscal 
surpluses or deficits on the value of its liabilities.  
 In  contrast,  fiscally dominant governments set primary fiscal deficits 
independently of real liabilities – and may persistently run in the red.  A fiscally 
dominant government is one that can fully meet future obligations only through heavy 
dependence on the inflation or outright default.  Without inflation, the governments are or 
are perceived to be on a trajectory to insolvency.  
  We examine responses to the fiscal behavior of five Latin American governments 
– Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru over the period as evidence of the role that 
market perceptions of fiscal dominance have played over the last decade.  In fiscally 
dominated countries, responses of a nation’s growth and interest rates to changes in fiscal   2
balance can be 180º opposite that of monetarily dominated countries.   We use multiple 
empirical models to test for such responses in our five sample countries. 
  A substantial literature focuses on Brazil as having exhibited signs of fiscal 
dominance.   Our results suggest that Brazil is not alone.  Despite Latin American fiscal 
and monetary reforms over the last fifteen years, financial markets have routinely 
behaved as if several Latin American countries are fiscally dominated.  
  We also examine ties between a measure of fiscal dominance and the volatility of 
a government’s primary balance.  We discuss why problems with fiscal dominance may 
incite primary balance volatility – a phenomenon that is consistent with our model 
results.   
  Having examined an influence of fiscal dominance, we turn to influences on fiscal 
dominance.  Consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), whose work suggests capital 
markets’ memories of default are long, we find positive links between how often a nation 
defaulted over the last century and our measure of market concerns about fiscal 
dominance.   Considering the efforts our sample countries have made over the last decade 
to achieve fiscal balance, our results may surprise some analysts. 
  I.  CHARACTERISTICS OF FISCALLY DOMINATED COUNTRIES 
  Because markets identify fiscal dominance on the basis of expected future fiscal 
behavior, high current debt plays no role in forging fiscal dominance’s peculiar links 
between fiscal balance, interest rates and growth.  Some Western European countries – 
Belgium is an example – have high debt relative to GDP but markets do not treat them as 
fiscally dominated.  Some formerly problematic countries, such as the Republic of 
Ireland, have reduced their debt burdens dramatically.  Even before the adjustment took   3
place, the market showed signs that it perceived that Ireland’s had become a monetary 
dominant regime. 
  Conversely, markets may identify fiscal dominance in countries whose debt 
measures are not currently high, but where a build-up of contingent debt may create 
incentives to monetize liabilities.  An example is Argentina in the middle and late 1990s 
when it ran fiscal deficits during marked real GDP expansions. 
  The financial market hallmark of a fiscally dominated country is a special 
category of crowding out.  Special is the operative word here.  Monetarily dominated 
regimes can also crowd out the availability of financing for private sector borrowers. 
  In monetarily dominated regimes crowding out, when it occurs at all, is typically 
only partial – at least in the short run.  As a result, expansionary (contractionary) fiscal 
policy may cause GDP to expand (contract).  In the worst case for monetarily dominant 
regimes, a rise in interest rates caused by larger fiscal deficits completely crowds out 
private investment and fiscal policy has no effect on GDP.  
  That fiscal policy has no effect in the worst case scenario for monetarily dominant 
regimes is what separates them from fiscally dominated regimes.  In fiscally dominated 
regimes, changes in fiscal policy have such extreme effects on interest rates that they 
more than swamp whatever direct effects fiscal policy may have.  Fiscal deficits 
accordingly become contractionary rather than expansionary.  We refer to this 
phenomenon as hypercrowding out .  Viewed from the opposite direction, hypercrowding 
out in fiscally dominant countries means that fiscal tightening becomes expansionary.  
Raising the primary fiscal surplus lowers real interest rates so much that GDP expands 
despite the direct contraction of aggregate demand from fiscal tightening.       4
  To enhance our ability to make legitimate inter-country comparisons of fiscal 
dominance indicators, we restrict our considerations to countries that did not default 
within our ten-year sample period. This choice rule nevertheless affords much cross-
country variation.  Fiscally speaking, ten years is not a very long time to be off the bottle.   
  A disproportionately large share of the recent literature associated with fiscal 
dominance (Blanchard, 2004; Favero and Giavazzi, 2004; Ramos and Tanner, 2002; 
Razin and Sadka, 2004) focuses on Brazil – perhaps because Brazil is perceived to be 
particularly susceptible to fiscal dominance.  We statistically examine some arguments of 
this literature as part of our testing efforts.  In a model explicitly about Brazil, Razin and 
Sadka (2004) argue that a solution to credibility or uncertainty problems reflected in 
credit rating shocks is to raise the primary surplus.  They argue that this step lowers real 
interest rates, but their model is purely conjectural.  The authors do not base it on 
derivation, optimization, or computation.   
  In a Brazil-inspired fiscal dominance paper by Blanchard (2004), both 
government debt and investor risk aversion are high, and much of the debt is 
denominated in foreign currency.  Under such conditions, Blanchard posits, a real interest 
rate increase will more probably trigger currency depreciation than currency appreciation.  
Blanchard argues that other interest rate effects – expressed through demand, output, and 
inflation – ought not to prove strong.  
  Favero and Giavazzi (2004) note that the ability of Brazil’s economy to withstand 
international financial shocks depends on investors’ perceptions of the country’s future 
fiscal stance.  They find that the sensitivity of investors’ perception of Brazil’s default 
risk as measured by the Emerging Market Bond Index to changes in the U.S. corporate 
bond spread is markedly dampened when Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio is high.
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   Because the primary fiscal balance in our five countries figures importantly in our 
testing efforts, and because current debt does not, we emphasize that the recent literature 
(except Razin and Sadka , 2004)
 2 formulates fiscal dominance as a function of debt 
instead of the primary surplus.  As mentioned, we show in the appendix that the current 
level of debt is the present (discounted by interest rates corrected for nominal GDP 
growth) value of all future primary surpluses and inflation tax revenue.   In a present 
discounted sense, the two are equivalent if one is sure about future governments’ 
intentions. 
  In sum, when investors are uncertain and the interest (discount) rate of a country 
is very high, the current primary surplus becomes more important to them.  In this case, 
strong fiscal effort can have a particularly marked effect on the perception of fiscal 
solvency and, so, on the discount rate.  Hence when the effects of fiscal dominance (here, 
high discount rates) are pervasive, the current primary surplus becomes a strong  
predictor of future solvency.
3  Accordingly, fiscally dominated governments may have to 
overshoot a primary surplus that markets would otherwise (without perceptions of fiscal 
dominance) assess as starting the debt-GDP ratio on a downward trend without 
overshooting.  In any case, significant improvement in the current primary surplus will 
have a disproportionate effect on perceptions of solvency and reduction in fiscal 
dominance.
4  Our examination therefore addresses how markets may react to a country’s 
fiscal stance through the responses of real interest rates to primary surpluses, of growth to 
primary surpluses and of the various impulses and responses noted in the work of 
Blanchard (2004), Tanner and Ramos (2002), and Razin and Sadka (2004). 
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II.  GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
  A comparison of pairwise Granger causality offers preliminary and very rough 
metrics on which countries seem to suffer from fiscal dominance and which do not.  We 
perform Granger causality tests (Table 1) for four variables:  the real (domestic) interest 
rate (REALIRATE), growth (GROWTH), fiscal surplus as a percentage of GDP (BAL), 
and the exchange rate (XRATE) - for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.  The 
sample period is 1995Q1-2004Q1.  Our first two concerns are for the conventional 
wisdoms about fiscal dominance – that fiscal surplus drives interest rates and that the 
fiscal surplus (because of its extreme effect on the crowding out phenomenon) pushes up 
growth.  We also will want to examine Blanchard’s (2004) argument that an increase in 
real rates forces down exchange rates in fiscally dominant countries.  Recall that such 
tests are by their nature not as fully or well specified as the VEC models we subsequently 
examine.
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  In the case of Brazil, where analysts’ perceptions of fiscal dominance are strong 
enough to have attracted much literature on the subject, fiscal balance (BAL) Granger 
causes (at the .05 level of significance or better) real domestic interest rates 
(REALIRATE, first equation ) and growth (GROWTH, second equation) but not 
exchange rates (XRATE, fourth equation).  Perhaps surprisingly to those who imagine 
Brazil to differ from other Latin American countries, fiscal balance also Granger causes 
real domestic interest rates for Peru and Mexico. 
  In contrast, however, fiscal balance does not Granger cause growth (GROWTH) 
for any of the five nations except for Brazil.  Also at the .05 level of significance or 
better, real interest rates do not Granger cause growth for any of the five nations except 
for Brazil, although Peru’s real interest rate does Granger cause growth at the .0975 level.     7
  To more fully address Blanchard’s argument that an increase in real rates forces 
down exchange rates in fiscally dominated countries, real interest rates (REALIRATE) 
do not come close to Granger causing exchange rates (XRATE, fourth equation) in any of 
the five sample countries, regardless of the effect that balance has upon interest rate in 
them.  Note that fiscal balance also has no effect on exchange rates for any country.   
  Finally it may be useful to consider the effect of all three possible Granger 
causing variables (ALL) for each country.  In the first equation ALL Granger causes Real 
interest rates for Brazil and Peru but not for any of the other three countries.  ALL 
Granger causes GROWTH in Brazil but not in any other country.  Also, ALL fails to 
Granger cause exchange rates in any country in the fourth equation and fails to Granger 
cause fiscal balance in any country in the third equation.     
III.  VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION RESULTS 
  To address these same issues in a simultaneous equation context we move to a 
series of vector error-correction models - together with their corresponding impulse 
response functions – for each of the five countries in our sample.  We apply the same four 
variables as in the Granger Causality model to a VEC model, but with one, two and three 
lags for each variable.  That is, we include the GDP growth rate  (GROWTH), fiscal 
balance (BAL), real interest rates (REALIRATE), and the exchange rate (XRATE).  Our 
sample periods are the same as for the Granger Causality tests, 1995Q1 through 2004Q1. 
It is important to note that while the Granger Causality tests are estimated in levels, the 
VEC model performs its estimates in first differences.  This difference may be seen as 
explaining some differences between the Granger Causality test results and those that 
appear in the VEC model results and in the corresponding impulse-response results.   8
  For this model, we performed one-standard-deviation impulse-response 
simulations for ten periods out for each of the variables, but report only the results 
pertinent to fiscal dominance – the effect of BAL on REALIRATE (Chart 1)and the 
effect of BAL on GROWTH (Chart 2).  The complete series of test results including the 
complete Cholesky decompositions and the five VEC models are available from the 
authors.  
  The results from these simultaneous equation models are more complicated and 
more difficult to interpret than the Granger causality models.  To summarize the pertinent 
results, fiscal surplus (Chart 1) has its strongest negative effect on interest rates for 
Brazil, but its impact for Mexico is about three-fourths the Brazil’s while Peru’s is about 
one-half Brazil’s.  These results are similar to the Granger causality test results.  The 
results suggest market concerns over fiscal dominance for all three countries, at least for 
some substantive portion of the sample period.
6   Note, in contrast, that Balance scarcely 
has any effect in either direction for Chile, although the effect is slightly positive.  For 
Colombia, the relationship between fiscal surplus and interest rates is markedly more 
positive than for Chile.   In both the cases of Chile and Colombia, then, the effect of 
Balance on Real Interest Rates does suggest that markets believe fiscal behavior is not 
consistent with fiscal dominance.  Note that while Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru all 
defaulted on their sovereign debt during the “lost decade” of the 1980s, Colombia did not 
default on any sovereign debt at that time or since.   
  Moving to the impulse-response values for the link between fiscal balance and 
growth (Chart 2), the simulations show that Brazil is not an outlier, as it was in the 
Granger causality tests.  Granger causality tests showed only Brazil with positive relation 
between fiscal balance and growth (hyper-crowding out), but the VEC impulse response-  9
simulations show a positive link between fiscal surplus and growth for every country but 
Colombia .
7   Recall that Colombia was also the outlier in impulse-response function tests 
of the effect of fiscal balance on real interest rates and that these tests contradicted the 
notion that Colombia might suffer from fiscal dominance.  Footnotes 5 and 6 present  the 
10-quarter sums of the effects of BAL on REALIRATE and of BAL on GROWTH.    
  Moreover, in the vector error correction impulse-response functions the strongest 
positive relation (the outlier if one can really be called that) of all between fiscal balance 
and growth obtains for Mexico, not Brazil.  A certain global detail, however, makes the 
Mexico result less surprising that it may seem at first glance.  In the latter portions of our 
1995Q1-2004Q1 sample, drastic increases in oil prices resulted in an upturn in growth for 
Mexico.  Even though oil production over the last decade has played a smaller role in 
Mexico’s economy  than in previous decades, this role is still significant.  Meanwhile, the 
marked expression of oil revenues from Mexico’s state-owned oil company (Pemex) in 
Mexico’s government revenues meant a significantly positive move in fiscal balance.  
The result, of course, is a very special case of correlation between a move in the direction 
of fiscal surplus with GDP growth. 
  With respect to the magnitude of the positive relation between fiscal balance and 
growth, Peru is in second place and Brazil is third.  More generally, the vector error-
correction model results showing a positive connection between fiscal surplus and growth 
seem to imply that markets are concerned about fiscal dominance possibilities for all but 
one of the five countries.   The two impulse-response results jointly offer an instructive 
perspective on Colombia’s fiscal performance.  Colombia has far and away the most 
positive impulse response results for the effect of a one-standard-deviation shock to fiscal 
balance upon real interest rates.  The relation was positive, suggestive of an absence of   10
fiscal dominance.  The same interpretation may be directed to Colombia’s uniquely 
negative (of the five sample countries) relation between fiscal balance (surplus) upon 
growth.  Indeed, this last result is more consistent with what one might discover for an 
industrial country.   
  While this paper focuses on how and when the relation between a nation’s fiscal 
balance and interest rates signal market concerns about a nation’s solvency, examining 
factors that are influenced by this relation also proves instructive.  Recall that the current 
real value of a government’s net liabilities must ultimately equal the present discounted 
value of future primary surpluses.  More fiscally dominated countries may have to make 
proportionately larger fiscal efforts when struggling to maintain a steady debt-to-GDP 
ratio without resorting to inflation.  Chart 3 presents a least squares line depicting the link 
between (1) fiscal balance’s effect on interest rates (as measured by each of the five 
sample nations’ ten-period sum of interest rate responses to a one-standard deviation 
positive shock to fiscal balance) and (2) the standard deviation of fiscal balance for the 
same five sample countries.  Here, the stronger the measure of fiscal dominance (i.e. the 
negative connection between primary fiscal balance and real interest rates), the greater is 
the volatility of fiscal balance. 
  Having addressed effects of a measure of fiscal dominance upon primary fiscal 
balance volatility, we reverse the direction of our considerations to treat what may affect 
market perceptions of fiscal dominance.  One factor that may link past experiences with 
expectations about future fiscal balance is a nation’s number of past debt defaults.  Chart 
4 presents a least squares trend line depicting the connection between (1) the effect of 
fiscal balance upon interest rates (measured in the same way as in the description above 
of Chart 3) and (2) the number of defaults a nation underwent between 1901 and 2002.    11
Note the markedly negative relation between the two variables.  The greater the number 
of past defaults, the more a given increase in the fiscal surplus results in falling interest 
rates – a signal of market perceptions of the current value of a nation’s future liabilities.  
This result is consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), whose work suggest that 
markets’ memories of defaults are very long. 
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our modeling efforts support the conclusion that while the strong crowding out 
typical of fiscal dominance may be particularly characteristic of Brazil, this general 
phenomenon  also applies to other Latin American countries.   In the Granger causality 
tests Brazil, Mexico and Peru showed strong links between fluctuations in fiscal balance 
and changes in real interest rates. Similarly, in the vector error correction models’ 
impulse response functions the inverse relation between fiscal balance changes and 
interest rate fluctuations showed its most decisive expression in Brazil, but Mexico and 
Peru also showed markedly negative links.   
  The results for the connection between fiscal balance and overall GDP growth 
were less straightforward.   The Granger causality test results singled out Brazil in 
showing the strong positive relation one would expect between fiscal balance and growth 
in the case of fiscal dominance.   Other countries showed no such effect.   
  By contrast, the vector error correction models revealed that all but one of the five 
sample countries (Colombia, the only country that has not defaulted at any time since 
1980) had positive links between fiscal balance and growth.  Mexico and Peru 
demonstrated more positive relations between these variables than Brazil did, while Chile 
showed only a very slight (positive) relation.  In sum, this evidence suggests the 
possibility of market concerns about fiscal balance not only for Brazil but for Peru and   12
Mexico.  In Mexico the relation between fiscal balance and growth appear to have had 
other determinants besides what was typical in other countries, but the relation between 
fiscal balance and real interest rates does not seem to warrant those caveats.   
  The consequences of and influences on the markedly negative associations 
between primary fiscal balance and interest rates were also instructive.  A clear 
consequence of these associations and of governments’ attempts to react to them was 
higher variance of the primary fiscal balance (Chart 3).  Finally, as Chart 4 demonstrates, 
the strength with which markets set these associations for each country seems linked to 
each country’s history of debt default. 
APPENDIX:  DEBT AND DEFICITS 
  Simulations of Brazil’s debt-to-GDP ratio are based on an identity-based model 
that has now become common.
8 We start with continuous time and build to discrete time.  
Changes in most variables, especially money issuance, are closer to continuous processes 
than to discrete jumps at the end of the month.  But models based in discrete time – by far 
the majority of exercises – essentially assume that variables stay unchanged until the end 
of the period (month or year) and then jump.   When nominal variables change quickly, 
as has occurred often during the last ten years in Latin America, these two 
characterizations are very different from each other. 
 The Relationship between Debt and Deficits 
The relationship between government debt and deficits derives from the government’s 
dynamic budget constraint.  Under this paradigm, the government must finance its 
deficits by issuing interest bearing debt Dt, i.e., bonds, and noninterest bearing debt -  
monetary base Mt.  We divide government accounts into two components, the primary   13
account δ that excludes interest payments, and interest payments.  These last are equal to 
the average interest rate on the debt it multiplied by the level of the debt at any time t. 
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Inverting this last relationship shows that real seigniorage is the sum of the change in the 
real monetary base and the inflation tax.  In the steady state, that is when individuals have 
found their optimal real balances, seigniorage equals the inflation tax. 
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Substituting these into the expression above yields: 
t t t t t t t t t m y d y i d ) ~ ( ) ~ ( + − − − + − = π π δ &    14













s s s s
t s
s ds m y ds y i ds d ] ) ~ [( ] ) ~ ( [ ) ( π π δ &  




− − − −
∞
=
− − − − + + =
t s
t s y i
s s s
t s
t s y i
s t ds e m y ds e d
s s s s s s ) ( ) ~ ( ) ( ) ~ ( ) ~ (
π π π δ  
The sustainable level of debt is equal to the present discounted value of all future primary 
surpluses and inflation tax revenue with the growth adjusted real interest rate as the 
discount rate.  If we assume a constant primary surplus, constant inflation and nominal 
interest rates, and a constant rate of real GDP growth, real money demand will also be 












This expression represents the maximum level of debt to GDP that a given primary 
surplus can sustain for given nominal interest rate, and nominal GDP growth rate.  In this 
context, the inflation tax deserves attention.  For example in Brazil, with nominal GDP 
growth of 12% and m of 5% of GDP, the inflation tax is around 0.4% of GDP.  With 
growth adjusted real interest rates of 4%, the inflation tax allows the government an 
additional 10% of GDP in debt. We can add foreign and USD-linked debt rather easily 
but doing so here adds nothing to our discussion.  Inasmuch as the analysis up to now is 
only identity based, a full theoretical analysis demands the introduction of behavioral   15
relationships.  In the next section, we look at one particular relationship between primary 
surpluses and real interest rates. 
When Real Interest Rates Depend on Primary Surpluses 
Suppose now that the real interest rate is dependent in some linear and negative way on 
primary surpluses.
9 
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Substituting this relationship into the debt-GDP growth difference equation yields 
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The discount rate thus falls with an increase in the primary surplus expanding more than 
proportionately the maximum sustainable debt-GDP ratio.  To see this, consider the 












Here, increases in the primary surplus offer a markedly stronger effect: 
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As long as long-run real interest rates β are larger than long run growth – a condition for 
Pareto optimality – for every increase in the primary surplus as a percent of GDP, the 
maximum sustainable debt to GDP ratio will increase by more than in the credible case.
10   17
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
  *Gruben:  Vice-President and senior economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 
william.c.gruben@dal.frb.org, Phone:  214-922-5155.  
   Welch:  Senior Vice-President, Sovereign Strategy, Lehman Brothers, john.welch@lehman.com, 
Phone 212-526-5843. 
 
1 Favero and Giavazzi find that the elasticity of the EMBI spread with respect to the US corporate 
spread is  0.4 for a debt-to-GDP ratio below 0.55 and increases asymptotically to 0.8 as the debt ratio rises 
 
2Razin and Sadka (2004) see current primary surpluses as decreasing future taxes including the 
inflation tax.  They assume a negative relation between future taxes and real interest rates.  That is, they 
assume the same negative relationship between primary surpluses and real interest rates for which we test. 
 
3 In a recent conversation, Guillermo Mondino offered another reason why the primary surplus is a 
predictor of future solvency in a discount rate context.  Mondino’s focus involves how the evolution of  
investor perceptions about solvency affect the recovery value of government debt at different maturities. 
 
4 See the appendix.  If the discount rate is a negative function of the primary surplus, the 
maximum debt-GDP increases by more than when the discount rate is independent of fundamentals. 
 
5 We always performed the Granger Causality tests using first differenced data because ADF tests 
for most of the variables for most of the countries could not reject unit roots in levels.  In 7 of the 28 
variables, ADF tests did reject unit roots in levels.  These cases include:  Brazil, Realirate and Growth; 
Chile, Realirate; Colombia, Realirate and Growth;  Mexico, none; Peru, Realirate and Growth.   
 
6 The effect of a one std. dev. shock to BAL upon variation in REALIRATE over a ten-quarter 
period is:  Brazil -32.02809 , Chile 2.806225, Colombia 10.41389, Mexico -24.02322, Peru  -16.17642. 
 
7 Effect of a one std. deviation shock to BAL upon variation in GROWTH over ten quarters is: 
Brazil 5.623662, Chile 1.766032, Colombia -4.562899, Mexico 13.63276,  Peru  10.46617. 
  
8  See Welch, Primo Braga, and Afonso André  (1987). 
 
9 For now we have no interpretation for β.  On the face of things, it represents the equilibrium real 
interest rate compatible with no primary surplus.   
 
10 The condition reduces to  0 ~ > + + αδ π y  which obtains sufficiently if nominal GDP growth 
and primary surpluses are positive.   19




       VAR PAIRWISE GRANGER CAUSALITY/BLOCK EXOGENEITY WALD TESTS
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Dep. Variable:  REALIRATE
BAL Chi sq 11.0312 2.6594 6.0534 7.874 12.3705
sig level   (0.0116)   ( 0.4472)   '(0.1090)    (0.0487)    (0.0062)
GROWTH Chi sq 2.8502 1.0347 0.7517 0.7527 27.3774
sig level   '(0.4153    (0.7929)   (0.8610)   ' (0.8607)    (0.0000)
XRATE Chi sq 11.9874 1.842 5.0757 1.4781 6.0045
sig level   (0.0074) '   (0.6058)  (0.1663)    (0.6873)   (0.1114)
ALL Chi sq 24.8896 5.3233 13.4656 10.0995 54.5524
sig level   '(0.0042)    (0.8053)   '(0.1426)    (0.3425)    (0.0000)
Dep. Variable:  GROWTH
BAL Chi-sq 12.0243 4.8404 2.7666 2.6096 2.5038
sig level    (0.0073)   ( 0.1839)    (0.4290)   (0.4558)    (0.4746)
REALIRATE Chi-sq 18.8168 4.6974 5.6527 2.4573 6.3089
sig level   (0.0003)    (0.1953)    (0.1298)    (0.4831)    (0.0975)
XRATE Chi-sq 21.7117 3.4277 1.7328 1.6958 0.1345
sig level    (0.0000)  ' ( 0.3303)    (0.6296)    (0.6379)   (0.9874)
ALL Chi sq 44.4735 12.9355 10.1651 9.5607 9.3303
sig level    (0.0000)    '(0.1655)    (0.3372)    (0.3872)    (0.4074)
Dep. Variable:  BAL
GROWTH Chi-sq 8.17335 2.8898 1.883876 0.87749 3.4545
sig level  (0.0426)    (0.4089) (0.5968)  (0.8309)     (0.3267)
REALIRATE Chi-sq 0.16145 2.1391 4.672917 2.996343 1.0925
sig level  (0.9836)   '(0.5441) (0.1974) (0.3922)    (0.7789)
XRATE Chi-sq 0.5916 0.1115 3.654469 7.072936 1.8443
sig level  (0.8984)   (0.9904)  (0.3013) (0.0696)    (0.6053)
ALL Chi-sq 11.7931 7.71612 10.4266 10.69745 8.1379
sig level  (0.2252)   (0.5630)  (0.3171) (0.2970)    (0.5203)
Dep. Variable:  XRATE
BAL Chi sq 0.8549 0.9153 1.1356 0.8943 2.9221
sig level    (0.8363)    (0.8217)    (0.7685)   ' (0.8268)    (0.4038)
GROWTH Chi sq 1.6833 0.7832 0.1372 1.3552 0.6644
sig level    (0.6407)    (0.8535)    (0.9870)    '(0.7161)     (0.8815)
REALIRATE Chi sq 1.5704 0.6149 1.0546 3.9582 1.8432
sig level    (0.6661)    (0.8930)   (0.7880)    (0.2660)    (0.6056)
ALL Chi sq 6.3482 2.7218 2.6562 6.8627 7.0581
sig level  '  (0.7046)    (0.9743)    (0.9764)    (0.6514)   '(0.6311) 
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Chart 1: Impulse Responses of Real Interest Rate to a One Standard Deviation Positive Change in 
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Chart 2: Impulse Response of Growth to a one Standard Deviation Positive Change in the Primary 
Balance. 
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Chart 2: Impulse Response of Growth to a one Standard Deviation Positive Change in the Primary 
Balance. 
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Chart 3
Standard Deviation of Fiscal Balance versus Real Interest Rate Response to 
Fiscal Balance




































Number of Defaults from 1902 to 2002 versus Real Interest Rate Response to 
Fiscal Balance
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